Philosophy

Contemporary conceptions of truth: What is truth? What sort of things are true (or false)? Is truth a special property of the things that are true? Is there a genuine concept of truth, or just a word “true”? If truth is a property, what kind of property? If there is a concept of truth, can this concept be defined? Philosophers have always asked these questions. The course deals with four different lines of thought. Some philosophers, substantivists about truth, think that truth is a substantive concept (or property), i.e. a concept (or property) that is “important”, “interesting”, “significant”, “deep”. Substantivists maintain that a philosophical account of truth can solve important philosophical problems. Some substantivists think that a philosophical account of truth should take the form of a definition or an analysis: they believe that truth can be defined or analyzed in terms of other independent notions, like correspondence, or coherence. A different kind of substantivism is primitivism: primitivists argue that the concept of truth plays an important explanatory role and is fundamental, but indefinable and unanalyzable. Other philosophers, deflationists about truth, deny that truth has an explanatory role in philosophy. Deflationists focus on a trivial logical property of the word “true”: in everyday linguistic usage the result of applying phrases like “...is true” or “it is true that ...” to a sentence p is equivalent to p. Deflationists claim that no further or deeper account of truth should be expected. A fourth group of philosophers, pluralists about truth, think that there is more than one property in virtue of which sentences in different areas of discourse are true: there are mathematical truths, moral truths and physical truths, which are true because they respectively have three different truth-properties. We address the issues discussed by deflationists, substantivists, pluralists, primitivists and non-primitivists through a reading of papers written by five contemporary philosophers: Paul Horwich, Robert Brandom, Jamin Asay, Michael Lynch, Gila Sher.

A knowledge corresponding to the level of the bachelor’s degree in philosophy is required.

1) Paul Horwich, «What is Truth?», in Truth-meaning-reality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 1-11. 2) Robert Brandom, «Expressive vs. Explanatory Deflationism About Truth», in R.Schantz (ed.), What is Truth?, DeGruyter, 2002, pp. 103-119. 3) Jamin Asay, «Primitivism about truth», in The Nature of Truth, ed. by Michael Lynch, Jeremy Wyatt, Junyeol Kim and Nathan Kellen, The Mit Press, Cambridge, sec. ed. 2021, pp. 525-538. 4) Michael P. Lynch, «Three Questions for Truth Pluralism», in Truth and Pluralism: current debates, ed. by Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen and Cory D. Wright, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 21-41. 5) Gila Sher, «In search of a substantive theory of truth», The Journal of Philosophy, CI, 1, Jan. 2004, pp. 5-36.

attending the course is highly recommended

Written examination. Students must answer a number of questions concerning the adopted texts. The questions will be especially aimed at evaluating: 1. understanding of the relevant concepts (this involves knowledge of the definition, if the concept is defined in the text, and knowledge of the role played by the concept in the text); 2. understanding of the main theses that are advocated or considered in the text; 3. understanding of the arguments that are meant to support the theses advocated or considered in the text; 4. critical skill (this involves the ability to recognize fallacies in the arguments and to find and counter objections to the theses considered in the text). A final grade superior to 27 will be given to students who reach all the aforementioned goals.

M. P. Lynch, J. Wyatt, J. Kim, N. Kellen (eds) The Nature of Truth, The Mit Press, Cambridge first ed. 2001, sec. ed. 2021

Lectures in English. Active student participation is highly encouraged.

Contemporary conceptions of truth: What is truth? What sort of things are true (or false)? Is truth a special property of the things that are true? Is there a genuine concept of truth, or just a word “true”? If truth is a property, what kind of property? If there is a concept of truth, can this concept be defined? Philosophers have always asked these questions. The course deals with four different lines of thought. Some philosophers, substantivists about truth, think that truth is a substantive concept (or property), i.e. a concept (or property) that is “important”, “interesting”, “significant”, “deep”. Substantivists maintain that a philosophical account of truth can solve important philosophical problems. Some substantivists think that a philosophical account of truth should take the form of a definition or an analysis: they believe that truth can be defined or analyzed in terms of other independent notions, like correspondence, or coherence. A different kind of substantivism is primitivism: primitivists argue that the concept of truth plays an important explanatory role and is fundamental, but indefinable and unanalyzable. Other philosophers, deflationists about truth, deny that truth has an explanatory role in philosophy. Deflationists focus on a trivial logical property of the word “true”: in everyday linguistic usage the result of applying phrases like “...is true” or “it is true that ...” to a sentence p is equivalent to p. Deflationists claim that no further or deeper account of truth should be expected. A fourth group of philosophers, pluralists about truth, think that there is more than one property in virtue of which sentences in different areas of discourse are true: there are mathematical truths, moral truths and physical truths, which are true because they respectively have three different truth-properties. We address the issues discussed by deflationists, substantivists, pluralists, primitivists and non-primitivists through a reading of papers written by five contemporary philosophers: Paul Horwich, Robert Brandom, Jamin Asay, Michael Lynch, Gila Sher.

A knowledge corresponding to the level of the bachelor’s degree in philosophy is required.

1) Paul Horwich, «What is Truth?», in Truth-meaning-reality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 1-11. 2) Robert Brandom, «Expressive vs. Explanatory Deflationism About Truth», in R.Schantz (ed.), What is Truth?, DeGruyter, 2002, pp. 103-119. 3) Jamin Asay, «Primitivism about truth», in The Nature of Truth, ed. by Michael Lynch, Jeremy Wyatt, Junyeol Kim and Nathan Kellen, The Mit Press, Cambridge, sec. ed. 2021, pp. 525-538. 4) Michael P. Lynch, «Three Questions for Truth Pluralism», in Truth and Pluralism: current debates, ed. by Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen and Cory D. Wright, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 21-41. 5) Gila Sher, «In search of a substantive theory of truth», The Journal of Philosophy, CI, 1, Jan. 2004, pp. 5-36.

attending the course is highly recommended

Written examination. Students must answer a number of questions concerning the adopted texts. The questions will be especially aimed at evaluating: 1. understanding of the relevant concepts (this involves knowledge of the definition, if the concept is defined in the text, and knowledge of the role played by the concept in the text); 2. understanding of the main theses that are advocated or considered in the text; 3. understanding of the arguments that are meant to support the theses advocated or considered in the text; 4. critical skill (this involves the ability to recognize fallacies in the arguments and to find and counter objections to the theses considered in the text). A final grade superior to 27 will be given to students who reach all the aforementioned goals.

M. P. Lynch, J. Wyatt, J. Kim, N. Kellen (eds) The Nature of Truth, The Mit Press, Cambridge first ed. 2001, sec. ed. 2021

Lectures in English. Active student participation is highly encouraged.